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Given doubts about the reliability ofthe monetary aggre-
gates as intermediate targets of monetary policy, the
Federal Reserve attempts to meet its dual goals-gradual
reductionofinflation andmitigationofcyclicaldownturns
inoutput-throughpurelydiscretionary adjustmentsofan
interest rate instrument in response to myriad incoming
data. A procedure in which the Fed would consult a
nominal GDPfeedback rule, while retaining theflexibility
to use discretion in its monetary policy decisions, might
contribute to achieving its long-run inflation goal without
significantly interfering with its ability to pursue its short-
run cyclical goal. This paper describes such a policy
regime, andpresents some empiricalevidencepertinentto
an assessment ofhow it might work.
In recent years, the Federal Reserve has become more
explicit about its desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate
inflation, citing the beneficial effects of stable prices on
long-term economic growth.! At the same time, it has
retained the goal of mitigating cyclical downturns in
employment and output. Dual goals inevitably raise the
issue of which should take precedence when they have
conflicting implications for policy. TheFed resolves these
conflicts on acase-by-case basis, using its discretion to set
policy after analyzing a wide array of real and financial
indicators. Like most ofits counterparts in otherindustrial
countries, it uses a short-term nominal interest rate (the
federal funds rate) as its policy instrument (Kasman 1993).
In pursuing gradual disinflation over the last fifteen
years, the Fed has attempted to use the monetary aggre-
gates (mainly M2 since 1982) as a "noIT'J1nal anchor" to
help prevent short-term discretionary decisions from in-
advertently allowing inflation to stray from the long-term
goal. Annual target ranges have been established for vari-
ous measures of money, and these have been lowered
gradually over time to be consistent with declining infla-
tion'The idea underlying this approach is that ifthe funds
rate were adjusted so thatmoney fell within these declining
ranges over time, inflation would be slowed correspond-
ingly. At the same time, the ranges are wide enough to
permit flexibility to respond to cyclical downturns.
However, the Fed has de-emphasized the monetary ag-
gregates because their relationships with prices and output
have deteriorated, apparently in response to financial de-
regulation and innovation (Judd and Trehan 1992). As a
consequence, policy has been left without much guidance
from a nominal quantity variable that is closely linked to
inflation in the long-run.
This void makes it difficult to tell ifshort-run decisions
about the funds rate are consistent with the long-run
objective oflowering inflation. Moreover, since there is no
single variable that provides an automatic signal to policy-
makers that an interest rate change should be seriously
contemplated, each change in the funds rate must be made
on a judgmental, case-by-case basis. Perhaps inevitably,
there is a temptation for policymakers to respond more
1. See Judd and Beebe, this issue. For a discussion of the possible
benefits oflow inflation, see Howitt (1990).4 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
Putting these definitions together yields,4
So long as trend velocity growth is stable, any given long-
run growth rate ofmoney can be translated into along-run
inflation rate in astraightforward manner. When the veloc-
ity of M2 was stable, the relationship between M2· and
inflation was particularly simple, since historically the
especially as an alternative to the monetary aggregates
when their velocities become unstable.
The channel ofinfluence from nominal GDP growth to
inflation can be seen from the following definition, which
states that inflation is equal to the difference between
growth in nominal and real GDP:
2. This statement abstracts from possible effects of trend inflation on
trend real GDP growth. Thus lower (higher) nominal GDP growth will
result in lower (higher) inflation, which for various reasons may be
associated with higher (lower) trend growth ofreal GDP (Motley 1993).
However, these effects are likely to be small when compared with the
range of nominal GDP growth rates and inflation observed in the past.
3. We have specified the nominal GDP identity in terms ofgrowth rates
ratherthan levels. Research suggests that the steady-state growth rate of
real GDP is stationary, so that fixing the growth rate of nominal GDP
will result in a stationary inflation rate. The situation is more complex
when the equation is specified in levels. Itis uncertain whether the level
ofreal GDP is stationary or not, so that it is difficult to tell ifthe price
level would be stationary under a nominal GDP level target.
4. The relationships discussed in this paragraph are growth-rate ver-




~p=~m + ~v - ~y.
(1)
(3)
where li.p, ax, and ay represent the annualized growth
rates ofthe implicit GDP deflator, nominal GDP, and real
GDP, respectively. In the long-run, real GDP growth can
be approximated by a trend rate that is determined by real
factors including the growth in labor, capital, and produc-
tivity, and thus is largely independent of nominal GDP
growth. 2 As a consequence, any given growth rate of
nominal GDP can be translated into a corresponding
inflationrate in a straightforward way. 3 For example, trend
(or potential) real GDP growth commonly is estimated
at around 2 percent, so that a 5 percent growth rate
of nominal GDP would fix long..,run inflation at around
3 percent.
Since the growth rate of nominal GDP is· equal to the
growth rate ofmoney (~m) plus the growth rate ofvelocity
(~v), targeting money can be seen as an indirectmethod of
targeting nominal GDP. Thus,
(2)
In this section, we discuss why nominal GDP may have
some appeal as an intermediate target ofmonetary policy,
strongly and quickly to shocks that threaten a recession
than to those that are stimulative, and this can test policy-
makers' resolve to control inflation (Barro 1986).
Use of an interest rate instrument without the guidance
of a nominal anchor also tends to foster the questionable
view that the stance of policy can be characterized by the
level of the funds rate. As a result, tightening or easing
policy becomes defined as raising or lowering the funds
rate, while a decision to leave the funds rate unchanged is
seen as no change in policy. However, these characteriza-
tions can be misleading. For example, a constant interest
rate can be consistent with either tighter or easier policy,
depending upon what is happening to the other determi-
nants of aggregate demand. Thus a sudden rise in con-
sumer confidence thatleads to less saving could render a
constant interest rate more expansionary. The same prob-
lem also arises for long-run inflation policy. To maintain a
constant policy with respect to the inflation rate, interest
rates would need to change frequently to offset the effects
of shocks and assure that aggregate demand grew in line
with the economy's productive potential.
The purpose of this paper is todescribe a monetary
policy regime in which discretionary changes in a short-
term interest rate would be oriented around a baseline
interest rate path that would be designed to be consistent
with adisinflationorlow-inflation goa1. Specifically, under
this approach, the baseline (orno-change-in-policy) option
would be defined by a policy rule that would link changes
in a short-term interest rate to a nominal GDP target
designed to be consistent with the inflation goal in the long
run. Thus, the rule would provide information to policy-
makers informulating short-termdiscretionaryactions that
might help them avoid inadvertentlyallowing inflation to
drift away from its desired level over time. The nominal
GDP targeteithercould be made public orusedfor internal
purposes only.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section Idiscusses the relationship between monetary and
nominal GDP targets, and argues that the latter have
intrinsic appeal when unstable velocity makes monetary
targets unreliable. In Section II, simulations of a specific
nominal GDP rule are presented as an example to illustrate
some properties ofsuch rules. Section III discusses how a
nominal GDP rule could be used to inform adiscretionary
monetary policy, and concludes by briefly noting some
practical problems that would need to be solved in actually
implementing such an approach.
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trend growth rate of M2 velocity was zero. Thus, for
example, a 5 percent growth rate of M2 would produce
5 percent nominal GDP growth and 3 percent inflation in
the long run. However, when velocity is unstable, direct
nominal GDP targeting has the advantage that it is not
adversely affected by unpredictable swings in velocity. In
effect, nominal GDP targeting is a way to circumvent
problemswith the velocity ofmoney in conducting mone-
tat-y policy.5
The principal drawback to using nominal GDPas an in-
termediate target is that it does not respond as promptly as
money does to the Fed's policy instruments, and henceis
not very controllable, even over periods as long as several
quarters. Thus it would.be difficult for the. Fed, or the
public, to know if day-to-day policy actions were consis-
tentwith achieving the nominal GDPtargetovertime. One
way of dealing with this control problem is to compare
discretionary policy changes to those called for by a
feedback rule, which specifies responses of the policy
instrument toincoming data on nominal GDP. 6
A feedback rule of the type suggested by McCallum
(1990); for example, would specify that the policy instru-
mentwould beadjusted ineach periodby a predetermined
proportion ofthe difference between actual and targeted
nominal GDPinthepriorperiod. Iftheinstrumentwere set
strictly according to a properly specified rule ofthis type,
the nominal GDPtarget would be achieved to a reasonable
approximation over the longrun,even though itmight be
missed over shorter time periods. Hence, a practice of
orienting discretionary changes in the policy instrument
around such a baseline would provide policymakers with
information they coulduse to help them achieve their nom-
inal GDP target over the long haul. And, achieving the
nominal GDP target in the long run would hold average
inflation to within a reasonable range around its target.
5. Given that the ultimate objective oflong-run monetary policy is to
control inflation, it might make sense to target the rate of inflation
directly. However, as shown in Judd and Motley (1991), the lags from
monetary policy to the rate ofinflation appear to be sufficiently long in
Keynesian-type (stiCky-price) models that attempts at direct inflation
targeting might result in extreme volatility in the interest rate and real
GDP. Since itis desirable to select arule that is robust across alternative
types ofmodels, we have not focused Ondirect inflation targeting in this
paper.
6. The feedback rule discussed laterin this paper is specified along the
lines ofrules originally proposed and analyzed by McCallum (e.g., see
his 1990paper). Feedbackrules alsohave beenexaminedbyanumberof
other researchers, including Hess, Small and Brayton (1993), Judd and
Motley (1991, 1992), Meltzer (1987), and Taylor (1985, 1992).
II. EXAMPLE: A NOMINAL GDP
GROWTH RATE RULE
A number of differentnominal GDP feedback rules have
been exploredin the literature. These differ as to whether
the policy instrument is a reserves aggregate or a short-
term interest rate, and whether nominal GDP and/or the
policy instrumentare specified in levels orgrowth rates. A
common feature of these feedback rules is that the Fed
responds to actual data on nominal GDP rather than to
forecasts.7 This feature has an advantage when decisions
are being made by a committee of individuals who may
disagree·about the implications of incoming data for the
future path ofnominal GDP.
Below we briefly review research on a policy regime
in which the Fed changes the short-term interest rate in
response to divergences betweenactual and targeted nomi-
nal GDP growth rates (Judd and Motley 1992).8 A short-
terminterestrate is specified as the instrumentbecause itis
controllable inthe short run and because the FOMC has
shown a preference over the years for operating through
such an instrument rather than a reserves aggregate.9 Our
purpose in presenting this example is neither to advocat.e
this particularform offeedback rule, nor to advocate strict
adherence to any rule. Rather our purpose is to show how
this class ofrules might work as a baseline for discretion-
ary policy decisions. The rule we have examined is spec-
ified as follows:
(4) JiRt = X,(Jixt _ 1 - Jixt-l)' X, > O.
In this equation, JiRt is the quarterly percentage point
change in a short-term interest rate (we used the three-
month Treasury bill rate), and Jixt - 1 and JiXt-l are the
7. This feature ofthe rule could be modified to incorporate more up-to-
date information by replacing last quarter's nominal GDP growth rate
with aprojection ofthe currentquarter's data. Suchshort-term forecasts
would be purely a matter of interpreting monthly indicator variables
and would not depend very much upon views of the structure of the
economy. As such they would not violate thespiritofthe feedback rule.
8.. Specifying arule in terms ofthe change, rather than the level, of the
interestrate has the advantagethat itis not necessary to know in advance
the equilibrium level ofthe real interest rate. Underaproperlyspecified
rule for the change in the nominal interest rate, the economy automat-
ically would tend to adjust such that the real interest rate would move
towarditsequilibriumlevelovertime, whateverthatlevelhappenedtobe.
9. As shown in Judd-Motley (1992), in principle, a reserves aggregate
offers the possibility ofmuch tighter controlover inflation than appears
likely under an interest rate instrument. The main difficulty with these
aggregates as instruments of policy is that financial innovation and
deregulationhave made the velocities ofreserves and the monetary base
highly unstable. Moreover, increased international (paper) currency
movements have addedto problems with the velocity and controllability
ofthemonetary base.6 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
actual and targeted annualized growth rates of nominal
GDP in the preceding quarter. lO
The nominal GDPgrowthratetargetwould be chosento
be cons'istent with the target for inflation. For example, a
goal ofreducing inflation gradually tozero and holding it
there would imply that the nominal GDP growth target
would be lowered gradually toward 2 percent and held at
about that pace.
The strength of the interest rate response to a given
target deviation is defined by 'A, and would be chosen by
the central bank. As discussed below, simulations suggest
that a value of 'A of 0.2 would be sufficient to achieve
reasonable control of inflation, without raising the vol-
atility of output or interest rates compared with actual
experience in the past three decades. This value of 'A
implies that the interest rate would be raised (lowered) by
20basispointsduringeachquarterin whichtheannualized
nominal GDP growth rate exceeded (fell short of) the tar-
getby 1percentage point. Although this may seem a rather
weak response, it is important to recognize that under the
rule theinterest rate would continue to beraised (lowered)
each quarter so long as growth remained above (below)
target. According to the simulations, the consistent ap-
plication of this modest response is sufficient to hold
nominal GDP growth near its target over the long haul.
Simulation Results
In order to obtain a rough idea about how implementation
ofthis rule might affect the economy, we employed simu-
lations of two simple macroeconomic models under the
assumption that the rule was inplace and the economy was
hitby shocks likethosethatactuallyoccurred. We didlarge
numbers of stochastic simulations so that we could con-
struct confidence intervals for the outcomes for inflation,
10. As an alternative, the rulecould specify atargetfor average nominal
GDP growth over more than one prior quarter. For example, the nomi-
nal GDP target could be specified each quarter in terms ofgrowth over
the prior halfyear orfull year. This approach would have the advantage
of smoothing out quarter-to-quarter volatility in nominal GDP growth
(whether due to "noise" in preliminary data, inventory cycles, or other
factors) that might otherwise induce unnecessary interest rate re-
sponses. The disadvantage ofusing averages ofseveral past quarters of
nominal GDP growth would be that itintroduces additional lags intothe
interest rate responses under the rule. Simulation experiments with
the models referred to in this papersuggestthat these longerlags tend to
increase the size ofcycles in real GDP and inflation that might occur
under a mechanical application ofthe rule. In effect, using an average
ofseveral prior quarters ofnominal GDP growth delays the response of
interest rates to deviations of nominal GDP from the target, and thus
tends to set offcycles ofovershooting followed by undershooting ofthat
target.
real GDP, and the short-term interestrate. In constructing
these simulations, we had to assume that the rule was
followed precisely. If the rule were used as a baseline for
discretionary policy, the policymakers could attempt to
improve on these results in whatever ways they deemed
appropriate.
As with any counterfactual simulations, these exercises
are subjectto some valid criticisms, which mean that such
results should be interpreted with caution. First,.the sim-
ulation results will depend upon the particular model(s)
used. Since individuals will differ as to what they think
characterizes a reasonable model, simulation results may
be suspect. In an attempt to deal with this problem, the
simulations were run with two alternative models, a small
Keynesian model, and a (largely) atheoretical vector error-
correction model.
Second, counterfactual simulations are subject to the
Lucascritiquethatthe structureoftheeconomywouldhave
been different from history if the rule actually had been
used. To attempt to deal with this concern, we varied the
key coefficients inthe models andre-ranthe simulations to .
test for robustness. As discussed in Judd-~Aotley (1992),
based upon these exercises, we concluded that the results
were not particularly sensitive to the alternatives con-
sidered, although there were some instances in which co-
efficient changes did significantly affect the simulation
results. We do not consider our study, or any other single
study, to bedefinitive, anditwouldbeusefultotestthis and
other rules further in the context ofother models.
The simulations suggest that following such a rule
would have provided for improved control of inflation
compared with actual experience over the past three dec-
ades. As measured by the GDP deflator, actual inflation
averaged 5Y2 percentover the 30-yearsample. The simula-
tion results suggest that average annual inflation over
1960-1989 would have been held to between about zero
and about 2Y2 percent (depending on the model) with a
probability of two-thirds (see the box.) Moreover, it ap-
pears that this result could have been achieved without
significantly increasing the volatility ofreal GDPand with
a reduction in the volatility of interest rates compared to
historical experience. 11 The lessened interest rate swings
11. According to our simulations, arule thatfocuses on the growth rate,
rather than the level, ofnominal GDP has the advantage of producing
less volatility in real GDP and interest rates. However, the growth rate
rule has the disadvantage that the price level could driftover time in the
event ofa prolonged series ofpositive or negative shocks. One way of
attempting to deal with this problem would be to provide for occasional
adjustments to the nominal GDP growth target when it permitted
unacceptably large price-level (or nominal GDP) drift. This method
mighthelp to preservethe price levelin the long run, while retaining the
benefits of less volatility most ofthe time.JUDD AND MOTLEY/ NOMINAL GDP RULE TO GUIDE DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY 7
SIMULATIONS OF THE NOMINAL GDP GROWTH RATE RULE
Below we presentresults ofsimulations that assess how
the macroeconomy might have evolved over the past
three decades ifthe nominal GDP growth rate rule had
been in use, and the structure of the economy had re-
mained unchanged. In these "counterfactual simula-
tions," thetargetedvalues ofnominalGDPgrowth were
set to be consistent with zero inflation over 1960-1989.
We used a value for Aof0.20. For each oftwo models
(a small Keynesian and a VECM, described inJudd and
Motley 1992, pp. 14~16), we calculated 500 stochastic
simulations, where the random shocks in each model
equation were drawn from distributions that had the
same means and variances as the estimatederrorterms.
We measure inflation performance in terms of aver-
age annual inflation over the simulation period. The
volatility of output is measured in terms of the four-
quartergrowth rate ofreal GDP. Finally, thevolatility of
interest rates is measured as quarter-to-quarter changes
in the three-month Treasury bill rate. The results ofthe
simulationsare shown below inthe form ofone standard
deviation confidence .bands (thus, two-thirds of the
stochastic simulations fell within the bands.)
STOCHASTIC SIMULATIONS WITH NOMINAL GDP GROWTH RULE
ONE-STANDARD DEVIATION CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
1960-1989
AVERAGE ANNUAL 4-QUARTER REAL GDP QUARTER-m-QUARTER
INFLATION RATE GROWTH RATE CHANGE IN INTEREST RATE
. ACTUAL 5.4% 0.5% to 5.5% - 1.0% to 1.0%
RULE
Keynesian Model -0.2% to 2.7% 1.2% to 5.8% -0.6% to 0.9%
VECM 0.4% to 2.1% 2.5% to 7.5%a - 0.6% to 0.8%
aTaken literally, the results ofthe VECM simulations suggest thatachieving lowerinflation would produce an average rateofgrowthofreal GDP
that is above the experience in the U.S. in the post World War II period. This result reflects the well-known negative correlation observed in the
U.S. data between inflation and real GDP growth, which is embedded in the VECM coefficients. This correlation could reflect the effects of
inflation on growth, and/or the effects of supply shocks (e.g., oil shocks) on both variables. Since the VECM is not designed to distinguish
between these two effects, our results should be interpreted as agnostic concerning the extent to which low inflation might boost long-term
growth. In this paper, we take as given the Fed's stated goal ofgradually moving toward price stability, and do not attempt to assess the possible
effects of such a policy on average real GDP growth.
apparently arise because a consistent application of the
rule keeps the inflation rate under control in the simula-
tions, and thus highly aggressive policy responses are not
likely to be needed. Thus, for example, use of the rule
prevents simulated inflation from rising as sharply in the
mid 1970s and early 1980s, and thus moderates the size of
any policy tightening that might have been necessary to
return inflation to lower levels.
Onepotentialproblemwiththese simulationsis thatthey
do not take into account the effects ofmeasurement errors
in nominal GDP. Even though the rule involves policy
reactions to "actual" data on nominal GDP lagged one
quarter, these data are revised a number·of times before
they are considered final. Measurement errors in theearly
releases ofnominal GDP data, which policymakers would
observe as they used the rule, would induce movements in
interest rates and thus also affect outcomes for real GDP
and inflation. In order to estimate the size of any such
effects, we re-ran the above simulations with measurement
errors (equal in size to those observed over 1978-1989)
added to the "observations" ofnominal GDPin the rule. 12
12. The measurement errors were introduced as white-noise shocks
with astandard deviation of1.5 percent (annual rate), which is equal to
the standard deviation ofthe differences between the "advance" nomi-
nal GDP growth rates and the "latest revised" nominal GDP growth
rates over 1978-1989 (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Following the
approach of Gagnon and Tryon (1993), the model was estimated with
final reviseddata, but weadded shocks representingmeasurementerrors
to the nominal GDP growth rates that enterthe rule. Thus, the ruleused
in these simulations was: I1R, = >.. (I1X'_l + E'-l ~ I1X7-1)' where
E,-1represents measurement error. We also investigated the possibility
that the revisions are autocorrelated by estimating first and second order8 FRBSF ECONOMIC REVIEW 1993, NUMBER 3
This exercise yielded confidence intervals for inflation,
realGDPand interestrates very closeto those shown inthe
box-in fact, no confidence interval was increased in
width by more than 0.1 percentage point.13
Comparison ofthe Rule with ActualPolicy
How would the nominal GDP growth rate rule have per-
formed in recent years in comparison with actual policy?
To shed some lighton this issue, we conducted counterfac-
tual simulations over 1988-1993 in which we assumed that
the economy was hit by the same setofshocks that actually
occurred during this period. Consistent with the Fed's
objective to lowerthe inflationrate gradually overtime, we
(somewhat arbitrarily) assumed targets for nominal GDP
growth that declined by Y4 percent per year from 7 percent
in 1988 to 5% percent in 1993, so that they roughly
matched the overall decline ofnominal GDP growth rates
over the period.
As shown in Figure 1, the simulated path ofthe interest
rategeneratedby this combinationoftargetpathandrule is
fairly close to the path that actually occurred.14 These
simulations were computed using the latest revised data,
rather than the data the FOMC actually observed at the
time. When the measurement errors in these data are
accounted for in the simulations, the short-term interest
rate is about 50 basis points lower (in both models) over
mid-1990 to mid-1993 than the simulation shown in Fig-
ure 1. In the final four quarters shown in Figure 1, the
simulated interest rates with and without measurement
errors bracket the actual level ofthe interest rate (for both
models).
autocorrelation coefficients ofnominal GDP revisions over 1976-1983,
as shown in Walsh (1985). Autocorrelation was rejected at very high
marginal significance levels. Despite this result, we experimented with
first-order autocorrelatedrevision errors (with standard errorof1.5 per-
cent) in the simulations, and found that their effect was virtually the
same as the white-noise errors as long as the autocorrelation coefficient
was less than 1.
13; The small effect of measurement errors in the simulations results
from several factors. First, the size of the typical revision to nominal
GDPinrecentyears is sufficientto have onlyvery modesteffects onthe
short-term interest rate in the nominal GDP rule. For example, a one-
standard deviation revision (1.5 percent, annual rate) induces a change
in the interest rate of30 basis points. Second, as is typical of macro-
economic models, the coefficients linking changes in interest rates
to changes in real GDP and inflation in the models used in this paper
are relatively small. Third, interest rates affect real GDP and inflation
with relatively long distributed lags. Thus measurement errors of
opposite signs will tend to have offsetting effects on real GDP and
inflation.
14. Similar results were obtained when the simulation was begun in
later years.
These simulationssuggestthat, even thoughthe Fedwas
not following a nominal GDP rule during this period,
actualpolicywas not inconsistentwiththatindicatedby the
rule incombination with a disinflationary pathfor nominal
GDP.15 It should be noted, however, that the level (but not
the pattern) ofthe simulatedinterestrate is sensitive to the
exact level of the assumed nominal GDP growth rate tar-
gets. Thus, for example, an equally plausible set oftargets
that consistently were Yz percentage point lower than the
ones assumed wouldproduce a simulatedinterestratepath
that was parallel and uniformly higher than the one in the
figure.
Figure 2 shows simulations ofthe interestrate paths that
would be produced by adopting alternative targets for
nominalGDP growth, and compares them with the path
producedby the nominal GDP target assumed inFigure 1.
The line marked "easy" corresponds to a nominal GDP
growth rate target that remains unchanged at 7 percent in
1988 through mid 1993. Thelinemarked "tight" simulates
whatmighthave happened ifthe nominal GDPgrowthrate
target had been reduced by Y2 percentperyear from 7 per-
cent in 1988 to 4Yz percent in 1993. As can be seen, the
constant nominal GDP growth rate target is projected to
involve a lower interest rate by 1993 than projected under
the gradual disinflation targets ofFigure 1 (labeled "mod-
erate"), whilethe morerapid Y2-percent-per-yeardeclinein
the nominal GDP growth target under the "tight" policy
would have involved a higher interest rate. Under all three
target paths for nominal GDP growth, the interest rate
would have fallen noticeably in the 1990-1991 recession.
m. INFORMING DISCRETIONARY POLICY
DECISIONS WITH A RULE
The above discussion ofthe nominal GDPgrowthrate rule
was not designed to advocate that particular feedback
rule as a baseline for a discretionary policy, but rather to
provide a specific illustration ofthe properties ofthis class
ofrules. Given the demise ofthe monetary aggregates as
reliable intermediate targets, the FOMC attempts to meet
its dual goals (control of inflation and the mitigation of
cyclicaldownturns in output) throughpurely discretionary
adjustments of an interest rate instrument in response to
myriad incoming data. A procedure in which the FOMC
would consult a nominal GDPfeedback rule, while retain-
ing the flexibility to use discretion in its short-run deci-
sions, might contribute to achieving its inflation goal
without significantly interfering with its ability to pursue
15. Taylor (1992) has obtained a similarresult with a different nominal
GDP rule, using data prior to the most recent re-benchmarking.JUDD AND MOTLEY/ NOMINAL GDP RULE TO GUIDE DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY 9
FIGURE 1
SIMULATIONS OF A POLICY RULE
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FIGURE 2
ALTERNATIVE POLICY SIMULATIONS: 3-MoNTH T-BILL RATE
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its cyclical goal. Such a rule could be announced to the
public or used for internal information only.
Consultation with a rule could take several forms. For
example, Taylor (1992) has suggested that the FOMC
simply include the interest-rate "recommendations" of a
nominal GDP feedback rule with any other monetary
policy indicators they wish to consult.
While this idea seems reasonable, the decision-making
processmightbenefitby having afeedbackrule playamore
centralrole. Specifically, the interestratepathindicated by
a rule could be defined explicitly as representing an
unchangedpolicystance, inthe senseofaconsistentpolicy
regime designed to achieve the Fed's inflation goal in the
long run~ IIi this way, the rule-based interest rate path
would provide a benchmark around which discretionary
decisions could bemade. 16 In any specific situation, more
orless expansionary policies than indicatedby arule could
be adopted, During a recession the FOMC might want to
leantoward alowershort-terminterestratethanwas called
for by a rule. For example, ifthe growth rates ofreal and
nominal GDP were to increase-and thus to signal an
16. Following such an approach might enhance the credibility of the
disinflation goal (Judd and Beebe, this issue.)
interest rate increase-the Fed might choose to override
this signalifthe level ofreal GDPwereconsideredto befar
below its potentiallevel. Bythe sametoken, iftheeconomy
seemed to be "overheating," as a result, say, ofa surge in
demand for our exports, policy could lean in the direction
of tightness for a time. So long as such discretionary
deviations from a rule-based policy averaged out to zero
over time, the long-run benefits of a feedback rule for
inflation would be realized. Ofcourse, if it were deemed
advisable to change the inflation objective, the policy
regime could be modified by changing the nominal GDP
target itself.
In this paper we have focused on the general issue of
whether using a nominal GDP feedback rule as a baseline
for discretionary decisions might help the FOMC achieve
its goals by rationalizing and simplifying the decisionmak-
ing process, Ofcourse, a numberofpractical issues would
need to be addressed before such an approach could be
adopted in practice. The biggest one would be to choose a
specific nominal GDP feedback rule. As noted above, our
earlierresearch suggests that a rule defined in terms ofan
interest rate instrument, a nominal GDP growth rate tar-
get, and a relatively mildreaction coefficient seems prom-
ising. However, since other .researchers have supported
other types of feedback rules, this issue is by no meansJUDD AND MOTLEY/ NOMINAL GDP RULE TO GUIDE DISCRETIONARY MONETARY POLICY 11
settled. Actual use ofa feedback rule would require more
research within the context of other models in order to
narrow the range ofappropriate choices ofrules.
A number ofmore detailed issues also would arise. For
example, the FOMC meets eight times per year, whereas
therules discussedabove give a "recommendation" for the
average level ofthe short-terminterestrateoveraquarterly
period (given last quarter's level). Thus a method would
need to be devised to link the decision period between
FOMC meetings (which averages 6Yz weeks) with the
quarterly period oftime used to define the rule.
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